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Abstract - In this paper, we present a new technique to protect the 
face biometric during recognition, using the so called cancellable 
biometric. The technique is based on image-based (statistical) face 
recognition using the 2DPCA algorithm. The biometric data is 
transformed to its cancellable domain using polynomial functions 
and co-occurrence matrices. Original facial images are 
transformed non-linearly by a polynomial function whose 
parameters can be change accordingly to the issuing version of the 
secure cancellable template. Co-occurrence matrices are also used 
in the transform to generate a distinctive feature vector which is 
used for both security and recognition accuracy. The Hadamard 
product is used to construct the final cancellable template. It 
shows high flexibility in proving a new relationship between two 
independent covariance matrices, which is mathematically 
proven. The generated cancellable templates are used in the same 
fashion as the original facial images. The 2DPCA recognition 
algorithm has been used without any changes; the 
transformations are applied on the input images only and yet with 
higher recognition accuracy. Theoretical and experimental results 
have shown high irreversibility of data with improved accuracy of 
up to 3% from the original data. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A biometric authentication system is a system that relies on the 
physical feature of the human body for identification. It is a 
system that is challenging the fatal problems in traditional 
authentication systems, such as PIN and token systems. 
Biometric is defined as a unique physical characteristic of the 
human body that can be used to verify the identity. It must be 
unique, permanent and universal for a well performance 
application such as face, iris, retina, fingerprint just to name a 
few. Face recognition is one of the mostly used biometrics. 
Many approaches and methodologies have been previously 
proposed, which can be categorised as, feature-based and 
image-based, [1]. Feature-based approaches are dependant on 
predefined features in the human face that can be used to 
distinctively identify the person. This approach has dominates 
in the past decades before the image-base approach was 
proposed. The image-based approaches are operating on the 
actual face image for recognition instead of the extracted 
features and templates in the feature-based, hence the name 
image-based. Their core processing procedures rely on the 
statistics of the facial appearance (they are sometimes called 
statistical-approaches), such as multivariate analysis. They are 
also called eigenface approaches, which have been intensively 
used in different face recognition systems and methods; they 
were extended to a number of different methods [2], such as 
FLD, FFC, KFD and KPCA. They are preferred to the other 
technique due to their analytical mathematical-base and high 
recognition accuracy. Although face recognition and other 
biometrical authentication have recently re-emerged with 
further development and improvement, there still exists a 
significant and fatal security problem in biometric systems. 
Biometric information is not protected and if it is compromised 
during any stage in the processing chain, the privacy of such 
data is lost and can not be used again as an identity. This is due 
the permanence of biometrics since they should remain 
unchanged over the lifetime of the individual to maintain high 
reliability for recognition. Cancellable biometric protects the 
biometric data by transforming the data into other domain 
(cancellable domain), where data cannot be inverse 
transformed to its original form. Recognition is conducted in 
the transform domain, which protects the data over the entire 
processing chain, hence the cancellable biometric should be 
suitable to perform accurate recognition. In addition, 
cancellable biometric enables the facility of regenerating 
different cancellable template of the original biometric when 
the previous one is compromised. 
The concept of cancellable biometric was first proposed by [3]. 
Several methods for generating cancellable biometrics have 
been proposed. The main idea behind cancellable biometric is 
to transform the original data to a certain domain, where 
recognition can be accurately performed, and cannot be 
retransformed back to the original data. The method in [4] 
introduces an approach that is based on tokenised pseudo-
random number and Wavelet Fourier-Mellin Transform 
framework (WFMT) for face recognition system. The method 
is composed from two components, generation of invariant and 
discriminative face feature with moderate degree of offset 
using the WFMT, and to attain the FaceHash by a serial 
number goes through a discretisation process. This number is 
obtained from an iterated inner product operation between face 
features and random numbers. In [5] the cancellable biometric 
is generated by encrypting a training set of images to construct 
a minimum average correlation energy filter for face 
authentication. The filter is convolved with the original 
biometric to produce the cancellable template. Cancellable 
biometric templates are reproduced from the original biometric 
by changing the convolution kernels of the filter. Cancellable 
biometric could be defined  as intentional repeatable distortion 
of a biometrics signal based on chosen transforms [3, 6]. The 
distortion is repeated in the same fashion during enrolment and 
for every subsequent authentication. For face recognition, a 
morphed image is enrolled. This morphing is achieved by a 
regular point pattern or grid that are overlaid on the image after 
transforming the face image into canonical position. 
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In this paper we present a novel cancellable protection method 
to the biometric information that guarantees both security and 
high recognition accuracy. We will also present details analysis 
on the characteristics of cancellable biometric and how it 
affects the recognition performance and accuracy. 
 
II. CANCELLABLE BIOMETRIC 
Original biometric such as face, fingerprint or iris cannot be 
cancelled or replaced by another one. To protect the biometric 
information, the cancellable version of the biometric has to be 
transformed in one-way sense. One way transformation is an 
open problem in mathematics, where ( )( ) xxff =−1  provided 
that ( )⋅−1f exits. Considering the strong one-way function, this 
function can be easily computed but hard to invert. Hence, if x  
is an input to this function ( )⋅f , the output y  is computed in a 
polynomial-time algorithm. On the other hand, this function is 
hard to invert in that any probabilistic polynomial-time 
algorithm could succeed to compute x when y is given with a 
negligible probability [7]. Recognition should be conducted in 
the cancellable domain therefore, the domain have to be 
suitable for accurate recognition performance. Conducting the 
recognition in the cancellable domain is the major concept of 
security in the entire system. It protects the biometric data at 
any stage of the recognition process and if any information is 
compromised, it is going to be the cancellable version of the 
information that can be cancelled. In addition, the reason of 
calling cancellable biometric like that is the possibility that it 
provides to cancel the template of the biometric that is used for 
the recognition when they are compromised by impostors, fig. 
1.  
 
Fig. 1: reissuing new cancellable template when the previous one is comprised. 
 
From the original biometric a number of cancellable biometric 
templates should be able to be regenerated, the larger the 
number, the better. This purports that biometric information of 
the human body to be abundant or endless. The proposed 
cancellable transformation is designed for image-based face 
recognition systems in general. Image-based recognition 
engines have been intensively used and well establish research. 
A significant improvement was achieved when the eigenfaces 
method was proposed [8] in the early 90’s. They proved their 
accuracy, efficiency and their good performance under difficult 
acquisition conditions specially the 2DPCA projection method 
[9]. 
 
 
Fig. 2: procedure of producing the cancellable transformed image. 
 
The cancellable transformation is established in several stages, 
fig. 2. First, the co-occurrence matrix is computed from the 
original face image. Then the original face image is passed 
through a non-linear transformation that transfers the image 
within a very non-linear mechanism, which involves 
polynomial computation and dynamical software manipulation 
of the polynomial output. The computed co-occurrence matrix 
is then used to extract the non-zero co-occurrence vector, 
which will construct the new co-occurrence matrix that is 
multiplied by the transformed image using the Hadamard 
product. The reason of combining these two stages is to reduce 
the correlation of the data samples and introduce outliers to it, 
which enlarge the recognition space in the face recognition 
system, hence better discrimination and separation between 
classes that leads to higher recognition accuracy rate. The 
Hadamard product is an element-wise multiplication of vectors 
and matrices. It provides good flexibility in the product term, 
which enables wide range of manipulation. It establishes an 
important relationship within the cancellable biometric data by 
the joint-probability of two covariance matrices as discussed 
later in this section.     
 
A. Non-linear\Polynomial Transformation (Stage I) 
Using polynomial function, new coordinates of the image are 
introduced. Polynomial functions of a high order are one-way 
functions that are hard to invert in polynomial-time algorithm 
when the input is of a large sequence. Let )(⋅f donates a 
n order polynomial function and X  is the input sequence that 
presents the coordinates of the original image. A new 
coordinates, Y that represents the image, will be generated by 
the polynomial. Each coordinate in the image is transferred to 
another coordinates through the polynomial function. This 
transformation will not change the intensity values of the pixels 
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themselves, which will retain the recognition accuracy using 
the image-based approaches, such as 2DPCA, unchanged as 
has been practically proved. The transformed images do not 
resemble any facial characteristics at all. In fact, they appear as 
a random data. Polynomial function used for transformation 
has a certain number of parameters. In tern, these parameters 
determine the new transformation characteristics. 
∑
=
=
n
i
i
i xaxf
0
)(      (1) 
By the polynomial function (1), the transformed value )(xf  
would have more than a single x value. According to the worse 
case scenario i.e. with the lowest security, there are two 
possible values of each transformed sample:  
1
1 ))(( xxff =−  or 21 ))(( xxff =−   (2) 
The image has a matrix size MxN . For simplification, the 
image is vectorised into one vector that has MxN  dimensions. 
{ } Xxxxxxx MxN ∈K54321 ,,,,    (3) 
Where X  is the image and ),,3,2,1( MxNixi K=  are the 
samples of this image. Hence, 
CXfxfxfxfxf MxN =∈ )()}(,),(),(),({ 321 K  (4) 
Where C is the transferred image in the cancellable domain. 
From (2), the worse case scenario, the possibility for each 
)(xf  is two. Hence the probability of occurrence is 
5.0))(( =xfP . It follows that MxNCP 5.0)( =  is the joint 
probability where MxN  is usually a very large number (in the 
order of thousands). 
In order to extend this solution, let us assume that the number 
of reversing possibilities of each )(xf  is k . 
∴
 kxfP 1))(( =     (5) 
And    MxNkCP )1()( =     (6) 
It is very clear from the final solution that )(CP is very small, 
which contributes to a very high irreversibility. 
 
B. Co-occurrence Matrices (Stage II) 
The use of the co-occurrence matrices is due to the fact that 
they could represent the image in terms of pixels’ relationship. 
Co-occurrence matrices are derived from the grey levels of the 
image. It is a second order statistic that measures relationships 
of grey levels in the image by indicating the joint probability of 
them at a certain displacement (distance and orientation) in the 
image [10, 11]. 
[ ]
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crjiCd )sin(),cos(^,
|,],[; θθθ (7) 
Where ],[ crI is the intensity at location ),( cr and ),( θd are 
the distance and the orientation respectively of the 
displacement vector that is also called the position operator. 
However, the co-occurrence matrix that we used is multiplied 
by the total number of pixel’s parings in matrix; hence it is not 
a presentation of probability anymore. A square matrix of LxL  
is computed using (7) [12], where L  is number of the grey 
levels. From this square matrix the non-zero values are 
extracted as a form of vector. This non-zero co-occurrence 
vector is then used to reconstruct MxN  matrix, where M and 
N are the original image dimensions. If the non-zero vector 
happens to be smaller than the matrix of the image dimensions, 
a repeated pattern of the vector is used to fill the rest of the 
matrix.  
 
C.  Recognition with 2D-PCA  
Two dimensional PCA is an extended version of the 
conventional PCA. 2DPCA operates on matrices instead of 
vector in PCA. The following algorithm is a summary of the 
2DPCA, further information can be found in [9]. Equation (8) 
is the covariance matrix, where ][⋅E is the expected value, and 
its total scatter is (9). The generalised scatter criterion is (10), 
where tG can be expressed as (11). 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]T
x
XEAAXEAAES −−=    (8) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]XEAAEAAEXStr TT
x
−−=   (9) 
Hence, the generalised scatter criterion: 
( ) XGXXJ tT=      (10) 
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The distance between two feature matrices is computed by the 
Euclidean distance, donated by ( )ji BBd , , where B  is the 
feature matrix. Therefore, for the test sample B , if 
( ) ( )jl BBdBBd ,min, =  and klB ω∈ , then kB ω∈ , where kω is 
the face class. 
Let A ′′  denotes the cancellable biometric face, Q the 
reconstructed co-occurrence matrix and A′  the nonlinearly 
transformed face as shown below: 
( ) QAfQAA oo =′=′′     (12) 
where both matrices Q and A′  have the same dimensions 
MxN and ""o  is the Hadamard product. The covariance of the 
cancellable biometric is given by 
( ) ( )[ ]AEAAEAEG Tt ′′−′′′′−′′=    (13) 
Since Q  and A′ are independent due some nonlinear 
transformations, it follows that 
( ) ( )[ ]EQAEQAEQAEQAEG Tt oooo ′−′′−′=   
( ) ( )
EQEQAEAE
EQEQAEAEQA
T
TT
o
oo
′′−
′′
−
′= covcov
  (14) 
From (14), the covariance matrix of the cancellable biometric 
consists of the covariance matrices of the transformed face 
images and the co-occurrence matrices that are multiplied 
using the Hadamard product. This relates the variations over 
the face images with the variations over the co-occurrence 
matrices with each other. Dividing the covariance matrix by the 
total energy distribution of the transformed images and the co-
occurrence matrices, will give the correlation matrix of the 
cancellable biometric, which clearly indicates the joint 
probability of the face images with its corresponding co-
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occurrence matrix. Hence, the discrimination and the 
recognition of face rely in the relationships between the 
transformed faces and the co-occurrence matrices that surly are 
varying from one set to another. In addition, the fact that 
polynomial function is presence in the covariance matrix via 
the transformed image makes the accuracy dependent to some 
extent upon the certain polynomial transformations 
characteristics. Note that the co-occurrence matrix is computed 
for the original face image A before the non-linear 
transformation )(⋅f . 
And for classification, let Y ′′  donates the extracted features of 
the cancellable biometric face. 
kk XAY ′′=′′      (15) 
[ ])()(3)(2)(1 ,,,, idiiii YYYYB ′′′′′′′′=′′ K    (16) 
[ ])()(3)(2)(1 ,,,, jdjjjj YYYYB ′′′′′′′′=′′ K    (17) 
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Using the Euclidean distance classifier, the results in (19) show 
that discrimination between different classes is affected by the 
co-occurrence matrices. This outlines a conditional restriction 
that relates variation in Q  with variations in A′ . Note that it 
does not relate Q  to A′ or via versa. Considering 
)()( i
k
i VXA =′  and )()( jk
j VXA =′  are two large 
multidimensional vectors in the Hilbert space, and let )(iQ  and 
)( jQ  to be two different vectors that have the same dimensions 
in the Hilbert space, the probability of the convergence of the 
two vectors )(iV  and )( jV  to the exact same magnitude and 
angle, i.e. same point in the Hilbert space, if they are 
multiplied, using the Hadamard product, by the two other 
vectors )(iQ  and )( jQ  is very small in comparison with the 
probability of being different.  
Let )(θP  be the probability of having the same angle, and 
)(MP  be the probability of having the same magnitude. The 
probability of both vectors to converge to the same point 
is )(EP . 
∑
=
==
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i
ix
PMPEP
0
22
1)()()(
π
θ    (20) 
Cleary )(MP is very small and the probability )(EP is even 
smaller when multiplied by )(θP to verify the condition of 
having the same angle and magnitude. 
 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The experiments were conducted on the ORL database [13]. It 
contains 40 classes with 10 acquisition of each subject i.e. 400 
images in total. Each image is 112x92 pixels. The face images 
have been captured under different conditions, such as posture 
variations of the faces, facial expressions and facial wear. Each 
pixel has 8 bits to present the grey-level from 0 to 255. 
Samples of these images are shown in fig. 3. The first 5 images 
are used for training the algorithm and the rest 5 images are 
used to evaluate the algorithm.  
 
 
Fig. 3: Four face images of the same subject from the ORL database 
 
The proposed cancellable biometric images are presented in 
fig. 4. They do not look like face images or any other images at 
all. They do not contain any shape as the morphed images and 
look like a random sequence, which makes them misinterpreted 
by humans. 
 
 
Fig. 4: cancellable face images of four different face images of the same 
subject in fig. 3. 
 
As has been proved before, the irreversibility of the 
transformed images can be calculated according to the image 
size (112x92) together with the number of reversed values of 
each transformed pixel. Let us assume that each transformed 
pixel has at least 3 inverse transformed values i.e. 3=k . The 
estimated probability of reversing the cancellable biometric 
face to its original form using (6) is -49175.53 , which is 
extremely small. 
 
Fig. 5: correlation values between the original image and the cancellable 
biometric. 
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This negligible probability indicates the success of a 
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm to invert the 
transformed images, which means very high irreversibility. Fig. 
5 presents the correlation values of the all original images with 
their corresponding cancellable versions. The graph shows very 
low correlation values for the proposed cancellable data, which 
should be at the correlation value of 1 in normal cases, this 
indicates that the images are not related to their original forms. 
In addition, the polynomial transformation has significantly 
reduced the correlation between the images themselves, which 
enhances operation of the PCA that tries to make facial images 
uncorrelated in order to emphasis the distinctive information 
for recognition. The unbiased estimator of the variance of the 
correlation values is 0.0010 with the mean 0.0435 and 
maximum correlation value of 0.1282. Whereas the morphed 
[3, 6] cancellable face images have very high correlation with 
the original data, where the maximum correlation value of the 
400 images is 0.9024, mean of 0.7856 and unbiased estimate of 
the variance of 0.0033. This is due to the retained shape of the 
face in the distorted images that is not much affected by the 
transformation. In fig. 6, we present the reversed transformed 
cancellable biometric of the morphed face image. The images 
were morphed using a sinusoidal wave that has a variable 
wavelength parameter along the axes to generate different 
cancellable version of the face. As observed from the results, 
the original shape of the face could be approximately achieved 
when the morphing parameters are available, which reduces the 
security of the transformed data. However, the proposed 
cancellable biometric as shown in fig. 4 and argued above does 
not contain any shape of anything, which makes it impossible 
to be estimated in a similar fashion. 
 
 
    
 
Fig. 6: first column from the left contains the original image from the ORL 
database, second column contains the morphed images and the last column 
contains the reversed images. 
 
Fig. 7 shows the recognition accuracy rates of the original 
biometric data, the proposed cancellable biometric data and the 
morphed biometric data. The two-dimensional PCA 
recognition engine has not been changed; the only change was 
conducted on the input facial images. The recognition rate has 
been taken up the first 20 principal component vectors with 
five images for training and five for testing. 
 
Fig. 7: the recognition accuracy rates up to the 20th PC of the original, morphed 
and the proposed cancellable biometrics 
 
It show the significant improvement of accuracy rate for the 
proposed cancellable biometric data over the original and the 
morphed data, where the highest accuracy for the cancellable 
data is 96% in comparison with 93% for the original data and 
91.5% for the morphed images. This shows that the proposed 
cancellable method has obtained both security and accuracy of 
biometric data, whereas the cancellable biometric data is 
expected to reduce the accuracy rate of the recognition such in 
the morphed images. The improvement of the recognition 
accuracy is stated more clearly in fig. 8.  
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Fig. 8: the improvement of recognition accuracy rates up to the 20th PC for the 
proposed cancellable biometric over the original and the morphed images. 
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For the original data, the accuracy improvement has reached 
the maximum of 6.5% at 17 principal component vectors for 
recognition, and for the morphed images, the recognition 
accuracy rate has reach maximum of 6.5% at the 1st, 3rd, 16th 
and the 17th principal components. 
To further examine the method, a comparison between the 
original and the proposed cancellable biometric is carried out 
based on the training samples. Table 1 present the top 
recognition accuracy rates for the first 20 principal components 
at different number of training samples. As observed, the 
recognition accuracy of the proposed transformed images is 
improved for all different samples in the table and the 
improvement sometimes exceeds 3%, such as 3.93% for the 3 
training samples and 3.43% for the 2 training samples. 
Generally, the number of principal components of the proposed 
cancellable biometric for recognition is higher. This is due to 
the nonlinear redistribution of the face image samples that 
substantially reduces the correlation of each sample. The 
energy in the cancellable data’s covariance matrix that has 
been normalised by the division of the maximum variance 
value is more concentrated along the diagonal, where the ratio 
of the energy average in the matrix (excluding the diagonal) 
over the energy average in the diagonal is 6.17%, whereas in 
the original covariance matrix, the energy is distributed along 
the diagonal and its surroundings with the ratio of 34.49%. 
This means that the covariance of the cancellable data is much 
more diagonalised than the covariance of the original data. This 
has contributed to the improvement of the recognition accuracy 
rate since PCA aims to diagonalised the covariance matrix for 
good estimated eigenvectors. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Biometric authentication cannot replace traditional 
authentication systems unless biometric data is protected. In 
this paper, we presented a new and secure biometric 
recognition for face. The proposed technique operates on the 
biometric data only. The generated cancellable templates are 
used for identification in the same way as the original data 
were used with no changes to the recognition algorithm. If any 
of these cancellable biometric templates is compromised 
somehow from the database, a new cancellable biometric can 
be reissued from the original biometric data without breaching 
the security of the original biometric. Re-issuance is made 
available by the modification of the polynomial coefficients. 
The paper also introduced and analysed the relationship made 
by the Hadamard between the polynomial transformation and 
the reconstructed co-occurrence matrix. The mathematical 
proof shows a new covariance matrix that is emerged using the 
Hadamard product to generate the final cancellable template. 
This matrix has linked some distinctive information from both 
measures which strengthen the accuracy of the recognition 
performance. Using the 2DPCA algorithm for recognition, with 
no changes, the accuracy is enhanced to 96% by 3% more than 
the original biometric data.   
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TABLE 1 
 ACCURACY OF RECOGNITION AND THE NUMBER OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENT USED FROM DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF TRAINING SAMPLES PER FACE CLASS 
Training samples per class Method 
1 PC’s 2 PC’s 3 PC’s 4 PC’s 5 PC’s 
Original 75.56% 5 88.13% 4 90.71% 6 91.67% 6 93% 7 
Cancellable 77.78% 4 91.56% 9 94.64% 15 94.58 11 96% 12 
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